MATERIALISTS claim that in principle mentality could be accounted for entirely by properties of matter. They must, of course, clarify, as far as possible, the precise scope of the concept "properties of matter." According to materialists there exists only one type of "substance" in the universe, namely matter. Sophisticated experimental and theoretical analyses have led contemporary physicists to interpret known material entities as being composed of two classes of elementary particles, namely quarks and leptons and constituents of interaction fields that (...) mediate interactions between some or all of the elementary particles and which comprise photons, gluons, intermediate bosons and gravitons. For instance, protons and neutrons are composed--by hypothesis--of quarks, while electrons are probably the most familiar leptons. Whether any analyzed and postulated elementary particles and constituents of interaction fields are "ultimate" components of matter can never be known. It remains always possible that more basic subcomponents of known components will be discovered. This has happened repeatedly throughout the history of physics. Hence, what physicists understand by the "physical properties" of the basic components of matter must always remain expressed in terms of usually intricate hypothetico-deductive theories which are tentative and fallible. Contemporary relativistic quantum mechanics of elementary particles and of interaction fields provide typical examples of such hypothetico-deductive theories relating to present known basic components of matter. (shrink)

The theory of pramonotheism is an important part of the theological conception of religion. Its founder is an Austrian theologian of the twentieth century. W. Schmidt. However, this theory was advanced and developed even before Schmidt in the Orthodox thought of the twentieth century, in which it was called "the doctrine of the original monotheism." The theory of pramonotheism was developed in the field of basic theology with the task of comprehending the emergence and evolution of religion in the paradigm (...) of Christian monotheism, as well as to refute views of religion only in the context of the natural laws of human consciousness and social life. (shrink)

His translation is, ‘obviously because the violence of the disease is dispersed throughout the body and as it forces out breath stirs up foam…’ The difficulty is that nowhere else does ‘distracta’ mean ‘dispersed’. Moreover, in vv. 501 and 507, in the same sequence of argument, the meaning is clearly ‘torn apart’, as usual. One way of meeting this difficulty is to read ‘anima’ in 493, as proposed by Tohte. However, this gives the barely defensible ‘anima spumas’ and is unsatisfactory (...) in another respect. Lines 499–501, in which ‘ut docui’ must refer back to 492–3, imply that the ‘animus’ as well as the ‘anima’ was mentioned there and that the effect of epilepsy is to upset the relation between the two. (shrink)

Until recently, the paradoxes of set theory were hardly used at all in the analysis of dialectical contradiction. "Violations of the Aristotelian law of contradiction have been found everywhere except where logic and mathematics saw them." Today a practice of study of paradoxes in set theory by the devices of materialist dialectics is taking shape in our literature.

This paper examines the creation of independent agencies within the EU, such as the European Environment Agency and the European Central Bank. Majone and others have argued the case for European regulatory agencies. Such agencies can provide for continuity, expertise, accountability and effective authority – in short, an institutionalisation of responsibility. Against this optimism, I argue that a dilemma of institutional design naturally arises from the agencies’ situation in the EU. On the one side, we risk creating powerful agencies that (...) institutionalise monomania– that is, agencies that single-mindedly and all-too-effectively pursue narrow agendas, inadequately checked by other bodies. On the other, we are also likely to encounter relatively impotent agencies which institutionalise schizophrenia– that is, agencies that must scout around for audience and support, and hence are unable to act effectively. (shrink)

The Four-Colour Theorem (4CT) proof, presented to the mathematical community in a pair of papers by Appel and Haken in the late 1970's, provoked a series of philosophical debates. Many conceptual points of these disputes still require some elucidation. After a brief presentation of the main ideas of Appel and Haken’s procedure for the proof and a reconstruction of Thomas Tymoczko’s argument for the novelty of 4CT’s proof, we shall formulate some questions regarding the connections between the points raised by (...) Tymoczko and some Wittgensteinian topics in the philosophy of mathematics such as the importance of the surveyability as a criterion for distinguishing mathematical proofs from empirical experiments. Our aim is to show that the “characteristic Wittgensteinian invention” (Mühlhölzer 2006) – the strong distinction between proofs and experiments – can shed some light in the conceptual confusions surrounding the Four-Colour Theorem. (shrink)

SummaryExtremism in the environment‐versus innateness controversy in the behavioural sciences and in human sociobiology is being examined. Genetic effects can be severely modified or overruled by environmental factors, but may, nevertheless, be important. Dawkins' view that we are survival machines programmed to subserve selfish genes seems untenable and is a root of racialism. It is also argued that morality is compatible with mixed genetic and environmental control of brains via existing biological machinery.

We propose probability logic as an appropriate standard of reference for evaluating human inferences. Probability logical accounts of nonmonotonic reasoning with system p, and conditional syllogisms (modus ponens, etc.) are explored. Furthermore, we present categorical syllogisms with intermediate quantifiers, like the “most . . . ” quantifier. While most of the paper is theoretical and intended to stimulate psychological studies, we summarize our empirical studies on human nonmonotonic reasoning.

In my view, Soviet philosophy must be judged not by the number of books and articles written, but by the works that won recognition in the professional milieu both in our country and, of course, abroad. There are such works and, furthermore, they are found in various areas of philosophical knowledge: the history of philosophy, social philosophy, esthetics, ethics, religious studies, logic, the methodology of scientific knowledge, and so on. Of course, one can accuse philosophers for writing during the years (...) of the existence of the Soviet Union many fewer good works than weak or mediocre ones, but this applies no more to philosophy than to science, art, or any other sphere of human activity. (shrink)